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INTRODUCTION 
 Football is viewed as a violent personal contact sport because of the 
player to player hits, some of which involve contacts to the head. While 
players have traditionally worn helmets in part for protection, the design of 
the helmets for protective purposes has varied over time. Notwithstanding 
the protection afforded by the helmet, former players of the National 
Football League (hereinafter “NFL”) have alleged that their consistent 
blows to the head are attributable to playing football in the NFL and that the 
NFL knew or should have known about the potential for these head injuries. 
 As a result professional football players have alleged that these 
contacts caused neurocognitive impairments. Retired NFL players have 
filed various lawsuits seeking concussion injury relief. However, just 
because the injuries appear to be similar to each other does not mean that 
the injuries alleged by plaintiffs in the lawsuits against the NFL are 
representative of the interests and incentives of all former football players. 
The neurocognitive impairments span a multitude of material factual 
variations of injury causation of injury and misrepresentation. Furthermore, 
there is considerable doubt as to whether or not one nationwide class action 
lawsuit is proper to address the claims of all retired football players. 
 This paper will discuss whether the prerequisites of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23, were properly applied in the certification 
of the class in the NFL Concussion Injury Litigation, with an emphasis on 
typicality. Discussion will begin with the general rule of class actions and 
drafter’s intent when the rule was enacted. It will then discuss the major 
amendment to the rule and the purpose of the amendment with a focus on 
typicality, and clarify the standard for the typicality requirement with a 
discussion of the United States Supreme Court decision in Amchem v. 
Georgine.1 
 The discussion then narrows the application of typicality with the 
Third Circuit’s Baby Neal test. It discusses the Eastern District Court of 
Pennsylvania’s misapplication of typicality with an analysis of where the 
court erred.  A brief comparison between the class action of Amchem and 
the NFL Concussion Injury Litigation is also discussed. 
 In closing, the paper concludes with a summation of the writer’s 
analysis of the District Court’s holding. 
I. PROCEDURAL RULE ON CLASS ACTIONS 
	
__________________________________________________________________ 
1. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
186 PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. L.F [Vol. 6:1:1 
 This section will explain the historical development of the rule 
controlling certification of a civil action as a class action.  Next, it will set 
out the specific rule as enacted by Congress in 1937. Then, it will discuss 
the major amendment to the rule’s typicality requirement in 1966. Further, 
it will discuss the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the typicality 
requirement under the current version of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rule 23. 
A. Historical Development of the Class Action Rule: Particular Focus 
on the Typicality Requirement 
 
 Traditionally, the Chancellor2 would decide if acts of a defendant 
that were complained of was a common injury to all the complainants; there 
was such a common interest in the subject of the suit as to authorize them to 
join in one bill; despite each injury being separate and distinct; and the 
relief sought was the same to all the complainants.3 However, a plaintiff 
who had a separate and distinct claim to relief could not join in suit for 
separate relief from each claimant.4 The decisions would require a common 
interest of some sort, in the situation known as a class action.5 Thus the 
representative must possess such an interest that the representative would 
have joined with the other members in the filing of the suit; and the court 
was to take special care to ensure there is fair representation.6 
	 The United States Supreme Court created a committee to study and 
draft rules of procedures for federal district courts to initiate civil actions.  
As to an action identified as a “class action,” the committee proposed a 
special rule. 
 Rule 38 originally provided: 
When the question is one of common or general interest to many 
persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable 
to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend 
for the whole.7 
__________________________________________________________________ 
2. During the time of English law, a judge who sat in a court of equity and ordered 
something to be done other than paying money damages.  
3. William Wirt Blume, The “Common Questions” Principle in the Code Provision 
for Representative Suits, 30 MICH. L. REV. 878, 879 (1931). 
4. Id. at 883. 
5. Hiram H. Lesar, Class Suits and the Federal Rules, 22 MINN. L. REV. 34, 36 
(1937). 
6. Lesar, supra. at 37. 
7. Id. at 36. 
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Justice Story, most known for his American jurisprudence 
commentary, is quoted noting: 
The most usual cases arranging themselves under this head of 
exceptions are; (1) where the question is one of common or general 
interest, and one or more sue, or defend for the benefit of the whole; 
(2) where the parties form a voluntary association for public or 
private purposes, and those, who sue, or defend, may fairly be 
presumed to represent the rights and interests of the whole; (3) 
where the parties are very numerous, and though they have, or may 
have, separate and distinct interests; yet it is impracticable to bring 
them all before the Court.”8 
As revised from former Equity Rule 38, the 1937 Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure Rule 23(a) provided: 
(a) REPRESENTATION. If persons constituting a class are so 
numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the 
court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate 
representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the 
character of the right sought to be enforced for against the class is 
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a 
primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class 
thereby becomes entitled to enforce it; 
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims 
which do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or 
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting 
the several rights and a common relief is sought.9 
The original rule attempted to define what constituted a common or 
general interest.10 Chief draftsman James Wm. Moore11 proposed the 
following as a tentative draft to the rule: 
(a) When Action May be Brought.  In the following situations, 
if persons are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them 
all before the court, such a number of them as will fairly insure the 
__________________________________________________________________ 
8. Blume, supra at 879. 
9. Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 414 (1967). 
10. Daniel C. Hopkinson, The New Federal Rules of Procedure as Compared with the 
Former Federal Equity Rules and the Wisconsin Code, 23 MARQ. L. REV. 159, 170 (1939). 
11. John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23 – What Were We Thinking?, 
24 MISS. C. L. REV. 323 (2005). 
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adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, join as plaintiffs 
or be joined as defendants, when the character or rights sought to be 
enforced for or against the class is  
(1) joint, or common, or derivative in the sense that the owner 
of a primary right neglects or refuses to enforce such right and the 
class thereby obtains a right to enforce the primary right; 
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of 
claims which do or may affect specific property involved in the 
action; 
(3) several, and there is a question of law or fact common to 
the several rights.12 
 The purpose of the categorical distribution was so that an intervener 
to a class action, whose only interest in the action other than that of the 
class, who shared a common question of law or fact, must be distinguished 
from an intervention which is additional to the main action; an intervention 
in the class action itself; or an intervention to a claim for a share of property 
or fund in an action.13  The second preliminary draft read: [S]uch a number 
of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all 
may, on behalf of all, join as plaintiffs.14 
 This modification was suggested so that one could not be a 
representative of a group unless he represented the common interests of all 
and could honestly and fairly try the rights between himself, all other 
persons interested, and the opponents.15 The goal was to ensure that in order 
for a party to represent a class adequately, his interests must not be 
antagonistic to those whom he would represent.16 The representative must 
then have a coextensive interest and is wholly compatible with the interests 
of those whom he would represent.17 The proposed rule attempted to restate 
the better practice of the decided cases of Equity Rule 38, which dealt with 
the subject of class actions, in the light of the history and long tradition of 
the equity courts.18 Accordingly, at the time Congress enacted Rule 23, 
typicality was meant to ensure the named representative adequately 
represented the members of the class. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
12. James Wm. Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems raised by 
the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEO. L. J. 551, 571 (1937). 
13. Id. at 575. 
14. James Wm. Moore & Marcus Cohn, Federal Class Actions–Jurisdiction and 
Effect of Judgment, 32 ILL. L. REV. 555, (1937) (emphasis added). 
15. James Wm. Moore & Marcus Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REV. 307, 
308 (1937). 
16. Id. at 312. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 325. 
2016]  NFL CONCUSSION CLASS CERTIFICATION ISSUES 189 
B. The Major Amendment to Rule 23 
 
 The Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
amended19 subsections (a) – (d)20 of Rule 23 in 1966.21 The Committee 
recommended amendments for adoption because the provisions on class 
actions relied on the terms such as “joint” and “common,” to define its 
categories. 22 These terms were found increasingly unsatisfactory.23 It 
became a concern for courts to classify or limit representative actions by 
reference to the abstract nature of the rights or duties involved.24 
 The purposes of the revisions were to create a more practical set of 
definitions.25 The revisions paid closer attention to the procedural fairness 
and included the procedural direction to the questions that arose about  
notice to the class.26 The rule was then revised to specifically state the 
requisites of any class action, which included the requirement that the 
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the 
class.27 The amendment to Rule 23(a) also added in clause (3)28 to 
emphasize that the representatives out to be squarely aligned in interest with 
the represented group.29  Typicality is designed to implement the due 
process mandate that the interests of absent class members are protected and 
it ensures that the representatives’ interests are substantially aligned with 
the interests of the class members’ interests by demanding that the 
__________________________________________________________________ 
19. However, this paper will only address the amendments to subdivision (a) as it 
relates to typicality. 
20. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) advisory comm. nn. (1966 Amendment, Subdivision (a)). 
21. Rule 23 was Amended in 1987 but only 23(c), 1998 but only 23(c)(1) and 23(f), 
2003, but only 23(c), (g), and (h) 2007 but only 23(d) and (f) stylistic changes only, and 
2009 but only the time set in the former rule at 10 days revised to 14 days relating to Rule 
6. 
22. Statement on Behalf of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Jun. 10, 1965), 
[hereinafter Advisory Committee], http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/ 
rules/Reports/CV08-1965.pdf. 
23. Id. 
24. Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 376 (1967). 
25. Advisory Committee, supra note 22; see also Kaplan, supra note 23, at 387 
(discussing The Committee’s proposition that a class action is based on a “class so 
numerous as to make individual joinder impracticable, questions or law or fact exist and 
are common to the class, and the representative parties are proper” of the class it seeks to 
represent). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. see also FED. R. CIV. P, supra note 21. 
28. The typicality prong. 
29. Kaplan, supra note 24, at 387 n.120. 
190 PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. L.F [Vol. 6:1:1 
respective legal and factual positions are reasonably similar.30  It is 
important to distinguish typicality and adequacy of representation although 
the two criteria derive from a single provision in the former Rule 23.31 
 Typicality requires the same legal theory (question of law or fact) 
and a degree of factual similarity, although varying facts may not always 
preclude a finding of typicality.32 It ensures that fairness and adequate 
representation of the class is achieved, by minimizing the risk that the 
representative party does not differ from that of the absent members of the 
class and that the outcome achieved would not differ absent individual 
adjudication of liability.33 
 Typicality also mandates inquiry into material factual variations 
among the parties, and must rely on probabilities rather than certainties.34 A 
common test for typicality is if the plaintiff’s claim arose from the same 
course of conduct or events of which are the same claims asserted by 
members of the class.35 For example, contested practices in collective 
bargaining agreements are well defined and applied in an identical fashion 
from one defendant to another. Therefore, the requirement of typicality may 
be satisfied.36 
C. Current Version of the Prerequisites for Certifying a Class 
 
 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the court 
to hear a claim on behalf of absent class members.37 The absent class 
members are then bound by the decision of the court and the outcome of the 
representative’s litigation.38 Ordinarily a representative in a litigation of this 
__________________________________________________________________ 
30. Samuel M. Shafner, Note, The Juridical Links Exception to the Typicality 
Requirement in Multiple Defendant Class Actions: The Relationship Between Standing and 
Typicality, 58 B.U. L. REV. 492, 495 (1978). 
31. FED. R. CIV. P., supra note 20 (distinguishing adequacy of representation from 
typicality). 
32. Shafner, supra note 30, at 495-496 n. 22; see Gregory S. Meece, Comment, Class 
Actions, Typicality, and Rule 10B-5: Will the Typical Representative Please Stand Up?, 36 
EMORY L.J. 649, 653 n.16 (describing typicality as whether a relationship exists between 
the plaintiff’s claims and the claims alleged on behalf of the class); see also WILLIAM B. 
RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §3:31 (5th ed. 2015) [hereinafter Newberg on 
Class Actions]. 
33. Id. at 507; see Meece, supra note 30, at 655 (explaining the function of typicality 
is to ensure the no interest of a class members claim will go unrepresented by the 
representative of the class); see also Newberg on Class Actions, supra note 32, at §3:32. 
34. Id. at 510. 
35. Meece, supra note 33, at 656. 
36. Shafner, supra note 30, at 511. 
37. Newberg on Class Actions, supra note 32, at §1:1. 
38. Id. 
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form would violate due process because an absent party to litigation cannot 
be bound by a judgment in personam if the absent party has not been made 
a party by process of service.39 However, Rule 23 serves as an exception 
and protects the rights of an absent party so long as the procedural rules of 
Rule 23 “afford the absent class members protection.”40 Rule 23 is a 
procedural device that identifies situations where litigation is appropriate 
and ensures to protect the rights of absent class members in conformity with 
the United States Constitution.41 
 Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the vehicle that 
allows the court put into operation the process of identifying situations 
where class litigation is appropriate while protecting the rights of absent 
class members.42 Rule 23(a) provides: 
(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued 
as representative parties on behalf of all members only if:  
(1)  the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable;  
(2)  there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 
(3)  the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of 
the claims or defenses of the class; and 
(4)  the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class.43 
 The first two requisites “numerosity” and “commonality” set out the 
criteria for the represented or absent class members to the litigation.44  The 
last two requisites “typicality” and “adequacy of representation” set out the 
criteria for the representative to the class.45  Adequacy of representation 
directly addresses the question of whether the representative of the class 
will be a sufficient plaintiff in the absence of class members.46 Typicality 
indirectly examines the representative of the class by “insisting on a class 
representative with typical claims.”47 Thus the class representative acting on 
his own behalf will also pursue the interests of the class at the same time.48 
In sum, typicality means the named plaintiffs must share interests, claims, 
__________________________________________________________________ 
39. Newberg on Class Actions, supra note 32, at §1:1. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at § 1:2 
43. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
44. Newberg on Class Actions, supra note 32, at § 1:2. 
45. Id.  
46. Id. at § 3:28. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
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and possess no conflict with members of the class, and absentee members of 
the class. 
D. Amchem Clarifies the Scope and Meaning of Rule 23’s Typicality 
Provision 
	
 In the case Amchem v. Georgine, the Supreme Court clarified the 
scope and meaning of Rule 23’s typicality provision. Typicality – as its own 
prong – must be satisfied as well as the other prongs of numerosity, 
commonality, and adequate representation as required in 23(a), in addition 
to a subsection of 23(b), even when taking into account a settlement. 49 The 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania certified an asbestos 
class for settlement in Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc.50 and found 
typicality was satisfied.51 However the court’s analysis was flawed because 
it failed to apply the test for typicality to the facts. 
 On appeal, the settling parties52 argued that, “in contrast to the 23(a) 
factors, which protect absent class members’ rights, the 23(b)(3) factors 
promote the ‘fair and efficient resolution of justice’” and the settlement 
“goes to the heart” of the Rule 23(b)(3) and “must be considered.”53 The 
Appeals Court disagreed with this stating the requirements of 23(b)(3) 
“protect the same interests in fairness and efficiency as the 23(a) 
requirements.”54 Further the Appeals Court stated the lower court erred 
because the application of Rule 23 requirements are not lower for settlement 
classes.55 Moreover, the lower court relied on “the presence of the 
settlement” to satisfy the prerequisite requirements of 23(a) 56 and opined 
the “typicality requirement is intended to preclude certification of those 
cases where the legal theories of the named plaintiffs potentially conflict 
with those of absentees.”57 
 The purpose of the typicality inquiry is to assess whether the 
representative plaintiff of the class has “incentives that align with those of 
__________________________________________________________________ 
49. Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 245, 316 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
50. Id. at 337. 
51. Id. at 316. 
52. A settlement agreement was reached for a fund that included a distribution with an 
administrative mechanism and schedule of payments that would compensate the class 
members who met the defined exposures to asbestos and other medical questions. See 
Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 267 (E.D. Pa 1994). 
53. Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 625 (3d Cir. 1996). 
54. Id. at 625. 
55. Id. at 626. 
56. Id.  
57. Georgine, 83 F.3d. at 631 (citing Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 57 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
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absent members”58 and to ensure the absentee members’ interests are fairly 
represented.59  The Appeals Court in Amchem relied on criteria set out in 
General Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon60 noting, “[Commonality and 
typicality]61 . . . seek to assure that the action can be practically and 
efficiently maintained and that the interests of the absentees will be fairly 
and adequately represented.”62 Commonality evaluates the sufficiency of 
the class and parties to the class itself, whereas typicality evaluates the 
sufficiency of the representatives or the named plaintiff, making them 
distinct requirements. 63 The Appeals Court disagreed with the lower court’s 
decision that typicality was met, stating that the “factually and legally 
different plaintiffs” 64 create a “problematic conflict[ ] of interest among 
different members of the class.”65 The Court went on to say, “no set of 
__________________________________________________________________ 
58. Georgine, 83 F.3d. at 631 (citing Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 57 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
59. Id. 
60. Gen. Tel Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982). 
General Telephone Company launched a recruitment and training program for minorities 
and after the defendant was denied a promotion that had been granted to several Caucasian 
employees with less seniority, he sued the employer seeking class certification.  Id. at 149. 
He claimed, “a policy, practice, custom, or usage of: (a) discriminating against [Mexican-
Americans] because of national origin and with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, 
and privileges of employment, and (b) subjecting [Mexican-Americans] to continuous 
employment discrimination.”  Id. at 150.  Typicality was not met where class certification 
on behalf of “all Mexican American’s who have applied, would have applied, have been 
employed, are employed, or apply in the future.”  Id. at 151.  The Court stated, “if one 
allegation were sufficient to support an across the board attack, every Title VII action 
would be a companywide class action.  We find nothing in the statute to indicate that 
Congress intended to authorize such a wholesale expansion of class-action litigation.”  Id. 
at 159. Cf. East Texas Motor v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977).  A plaintiff’s description 
of a claim is critical to securing or establishing the typicality requirement of claims for 
similarly situated persons.  Id. at 399.  City drivers at East Texas Motor Freight System 
filed suit on the basis of denial of equal employment opportunities “because of their race or 
national origin.”  Id.  Moreover, the rule requires that a class representative “must be a part 
of the class and  possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members.”  
Id. at 403.  The Supreme Court found because the class representatives were not current 
line drivers, they could not represent those who were line drivers. Id. 
61. Commonality and Typicality. 
62. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 83 F.3d 610, 632 (3d Cir. 1996). 
63. Id. (see also, Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 176 n.4 (3d Cir. 1988). 
64. The Appeals Court noted the factual differences (such as different medical 
expenses in medical monitoring and individual medical histories) would turn into legal 
differences because of the “differences in amount of exposure and nexus between exposure 
and injury lead to disparate applications of legal rules, including matters of causation, 
comparative fault, and the types of damages available to each plaintiff.” Georgine v. 
Amchem Prods, 83 F.3d 610, 627 (3d Cir. 1996). 
65. Id. at 632. 
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representatives can be ‘typical’ of this class”66 and that, “it is impossible to 
say that legal theories of named plaintiffs are not in conflict with those of 
the absentees, or that the named plaintiffs have incentives that align with 
those of the absent class.”67 Ultimately, the Appeals Court entered an order 
that the district court’s certification be vacated and remanded with 
instructions to decertify the class.68 
 The Supreme Court granted certiorari of Amchem to review “the 
legitimacy under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of a class 
action certification sought to achieve global settlement of current and future 
asbestos-related claims.”69 The Court specifically granted review to 
determine the proper method of class certification in a settlement action 
under Rule 23.70 The Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court stating, 
“[t]he Court of Appeals’ opinion amply demonstrates why – with or without 
a settlement on the table – the sprawling class the District Court certified 
does not satisfy Rule 23’s requirement.”71 Moreover, the court 
acknowledged that an inquiry that relies on the “legal or factual questions 
that qualify each member’s case is a genuine controversy.”72 The Court also 
noted, “[t]he words ‘claims or defenses’ in this context . . . manifestly refer 
to the kinds of claims or defenses that can be raised in courts of law as a 
part of an actual or impending law suit.”73 Thus a conflicting interest by the 
representative parties negates typicality and those parties to the class as 




66. Class consisted of claims of “(1) negligent failure to warn, (2) strict liability, (3) 
breach of express and implied warranty, (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress, (5) 
enhanced risk of disease, (6) medical monitoring, and (7) civil conspiracy,”  represented by 
nine lead plaintiffs for the class and all persons who had been “exposed – occupationally or 
through the occupational exposure of a spouse or household member,” or all persons, 
“whose spouse or family member had been so exposed,” Georgine v. Amchem Prods, 83 
F.3d 610, 620 (3d Cir. 1996). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 635. 
69. Amchem Prods v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997). 
70. Id. at 619. 
71. Id. at 622. 
72. Id at 623. 
73. Id. at 623 n.18 Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (U.S. 1986). 
74. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940). (holding, “because of the dual and 
potentially conflicting interests of those who are putative parties to the agreement in 
compelling or resisting its performance, it is impossible to say solely because they are 
parties to it that any two of them are of the same class.”). 
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 Prior to 2012, a number of former NFL players complained about 
symptoms of depression, forgetfulness, and even suicide. In particular, one 
former NFL player, Junior Seau requested after his death, his brain should 
be used to conduct scientific experiments as to whether the symptoms he 
suffered were attributable to concussions or other blows to the head during 
his football career. This and other evidence eventually lead to law suits filed 
by and on behalf of former NFL players against the National Football 
League. 
A. Application of “Typicality” in the Third Circuit 
 
 The Third Circuit relies on Amchem and Baby Neal to evaluate 
typicality.75 While Amchem post-dates Baby Neal, it remains good law. 76 
The Baby Neal case is the controlling case that sets out and explains 
typicality in the Third Circuit. The requirements of Rule 23(a) are meant to 
assure both that class action treatment is necessary and efficient and that it 
is fair to the named plaintiffs and absentees under the particular 
circumstances. The concepts of commonality and typicality are broadly 
defined and tend to merge.77 Both criteria seek to assure that the action can 
be practically and efficiently maintained and that the interests of the named 
plaintiffs and absentees will be fairly and adequately represented78. Despite 
their similarity, however, commonality and typicality are distinct 
requirements79 under Rule 23.”80 
 The test for typicality asks the court to consider a conjunctive four-
part test. First, typicality requires an evaluation of the “sufficiency of the 
named plaintiff,”81 but does not require that all the “putative class members 
share identical claims.”82 Moreover, “[f]actual differences will not render a 
__________________________________________________________________ 
75. Beck v. Maximus, Inc., 457 F.3d 291, 295, 296 (3rd Cir. 2006). (noting, “the 
typicality and adequacy inquiries often ‘tend[] to merge’ because both look to potential 
conflicts and to ‘whether the named plaintiff’s claim and the class claims are so interrelated 
that the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their 
absence.” (quoting, Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626 n.20 (citation omitted))). 
76. Id. (“[W]hether the named plaintiffs’ claims are typical, in common-sense terms, 
of the class, thus suggesting that the incentives of the plaintiffs are aligned with those of 
the class.” Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 55 (3rd Cir. 1994). 
77. 7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1764, at 
247 (1986). 
78. See General Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982). 
79. See Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 177 n. 4 (3d Cir.1988) (“‘[C]ommonality’ 
like ‘numerosity’ evaluates the sufficiency of the class itself, and ‘typicality’ like 
‘adequacy of representation’ evaluates the sufficiency of the named plaintiff....”). 
80. Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3rd Cir. 1994). 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
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claim atypical if the claim arises from the same even or practice or course of 
conduct that gives rise to the claims of the class members, and if it is based 
on the same legal theory.”83 To determine sufficiency of the named plaintiff 
the district court must "assess whether the class representatives themselves 
present those common issues of law and fact that justify class treatment, 
thereby tending to assure that the absent class members will be adequately 
represented."84 The plaintiff must make the required presentation 
demonstrating that he/she satisfied the requirements of that rule.85 
 Second, it requires an assessment of “whether the action can be 
efficiently maintained as a class and whether the named plaintiffs have 
incentives that align with those of the absent class so as to assure that the 
absentees’ interests will be fairly represented.”86 The named plaintiff does 
not have to “endure[] precisely the same injuries that have been sustained 
by the class members, only that the harm complained of to be common to 
the class, and that the named plaintiff demonstrate a personal interest or 
‘threat of injury . . . [that] is “real and immediate,” not conjectural or 
hypothetical.’”87 The named plaintiff may have incentives “plain enough 
from the pleadings to determine whether the interests of the absent parties 
are fairly encompassed.”88 However, the determination of whether the 
absentees’ interests will be fairly represented “generally involve 
considerations that are ‘enmeshed in factual and legal issues comprising the 
plaintiff’s cause of action.”89 
 Third, because typicality “is intended to preclude certification of 
those cases where the legal theories of the named plaintiffs potentially 
conflict” with absentee members of the class, it requires that the “common 
claims are comparably central to claims of the named plaintiffs as to claims 
__________________________________________________________________ 
83. Id. at 58 (citations omitted). 
84. Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson, & Co., Inc., 980 F.2d 912, 923 (3d Cir. 1992). 
85. Weiss v. York Hospital, 745 F.2d 786, 810-11 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting defendant's 
argument that "dichotomy between those who have applied and been rejected and those 
who are afraid to apply" was found to not be "enough to carry the day, for, in essence, there 
is only one class advanced in this case—the osteopathic physicians in the York MSA who 
are the intended victims of York's discriminatory admissions policy”). See also, Hoxer v. 
Blinder, Robinson, and Co., Inc., 980 F.2d 912, 923 (3d Cir. 1992) (where sufficiency of 
the named plaintiff was satisfied after a class was modified, to consist of fifteen class 
representatives for the sub categories of the twenty-one fraudulent equity securities, "a 
coverage that fully satisfie[d] the requirements of the Rule"). 
86. Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 57. (citations omitted). See American Pipe & Construction 
Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (noting advancement of a class action promotes “the 
efficiency and economy of litigation which is the principal purpose of the procedure”). 
87. Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 177. 
88. Gen. Tel. Co., 457 U.S. 147, 160. 
89. Id. (citations omitted). 
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of the absentees.”90 “This approach focuses on the legal and/or factual 
stance assumed by the class representative as compared with that of the 
class members.”91 
 Fourth, typicality requires an inquiry into “whether the named 
plaintiff’s individual circumstances are markedly different or . . . the legal 
theory upon which claims based differs from that upon which claims of the 
absent class will perforce be based.”92 The named plaintiff’s “[m]ere 
anticipation that all class members will benefit from the suit ... is not 
enough.”93 The interests must be “sufficiently parallel to ensure a vigorous 
and full presentation of all potential claims for relief.”94 
B. In Re NFL 
 
 On January 31, 2012, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 
ordered, consolidation of the following proceedings against the National 
Football League, et al. in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania before the 
Honorable Anita B. Brody.95 To certify a class the plaintiff’s must meet the 
prerequisites of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a).96 
Plaintiffs’ Master Administrative Long-Form Complaint lists the parties to 
the litigation by reference of, “Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs-Spouses are those 
persons identified in the individual Short-Form Complaints, which adopt, in 
whole or in part, the allegations and Counts herein.”97 The accompanying 
Original Class Action Complaint identifies five (5) individuals98 as 
representatives of Plaintiffs to the class and states, “Plaintiffs are 
representatives of Classes, as defined by Fed R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), and bring 
this action for medical monitoring relief on behalf of themselves and classes 
identified herein with respect to which the NFL has acted or refused to act 
__________________________________________________________________ 
90. Baby Neal, 43 F.3d 48, 57 (citations omitted). 
91. Weiss v, York Hospital, 745 F.2d 786, 809 n.36 (3d Cir. 1984). 
92. Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 58 (citations omitted). 
93. Id. 
94. Id. (noting, where the “plaintiff's factual or legal stance is not characteristic of that 
of other class members, the typicality prerequisite has not been met”). 
95. In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (2012). 
96. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). see also, In re Nat. Football League Players Concussion 
Injury Litig., 775 F.3d 570, 579 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting a court should not certify a class 
until the prerequisites of 23(a) are met). 
97. Plaintiffs’ Master Administrative Long-Form Complaint at 28, In re NATIONAL 
FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS CONCUSSION INJURY LITGATION, 961 F. Supp. 
2d 708 (E.D. Pa. June 7, 2012) (No. 2:12-md-02323-AB). 
98. Master Administrative Class Action Complaint for Medical Monitoring; Original 
Class Action Complaint at 5-9, In re NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS 
CONCUSSION INJURY LITIGATION, 961 F.Supp.2d 708 (E.D. Pa. June 7, 2012) (No. 
2:12-md-02323-AB). 
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on the grounds that apply generally to the Classes.”99 NFL Parties 
(Defendants) filed a 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss based on failure of service 
of process proscribed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(c), which 
was denied.100 
 Plaintiffs then filed a motion to conditionally certify a settlement 
class and subclass.101 Plaintiff’s Class Action Complaint identified the class 
as: 
 
(1) All living NFL Football Players who, prior to the date of the 
Preliminary Approval and Class Certification Order, retired, formally 
or informally, from playing professional football with the NFL or any 
Member Club, including American Football League, World League of 
American Football, NFL Europe League and NFL Europa League 
players, or were formerly on any roster, including preseason, regular 
season, or postseason, of any such Member Club or league and who 
no longer are under contract to a Member Club and are not seeking 
active employment as players with any Member Club, whether signed 
to a roster or signed to any practice squad, developmental squad, or 
taxi squad of a Member Club (“Retired NFL Football Players”); (2) 
Authorized representatives, ordered by a court or other official of 
competent jurisdiction under applicable state law, of deceased or 
legally incapacitated or incompetent Retired NFL Football Players 
(“Representative Claimants”); and (3) Spouses, parents, children who 
are dependents, or any other persons properly under applicable state 
law assert the right to sue independently or derivatively by reason of 
their relationship with a Retired NFL Football Player or deceased 
Retired NFL Football Player (“Derivative Claimants”). 
 
 Class representatives were identified as Sean Wooden (subclass 
1102) and Kevin Turner (subclass 2103).104 Sean Wooden and Kevin Turner 
__________________________________________________________________ 
99. Id. at 15. 
100. Memorandum of Law in Support of National Football League’s Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaints at 2, In re NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS 
CONCUSSION INJURY LITIGATION, 961 F. Supp. 2d 708 (E.D. Pa. August 30, 2012) 
(No. 2:12-md-02323-AB) 2012 WL 5974500. 
101. Motion of Proposed Co-Lead Class Counsel, Class Counsel, and Subclass Counsel 
for an Order at 40, In re NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS CONCUSSION 
INJURY LITIGATION, 961 F. Supp. 2d 708 (E.D. Pa. January 6, 2014) (No. 2:12-md-
02323-AB). 
102. “Plaintiff Shawn Wooden is a class representative for the Florida Medical 
Monitoring Class. He resides in Pembroke Pines, Florida. Mr. Wooden played professional 
football in the NFL from 1996-2004. He played as a safety for the Miami Dolphins and the 
Chicago Bears. During his career in the NFL he experienced repeated traumatic head 
impacts. After his retirement from football he has experienced neurological symptoms. Mr. 
Wooden is at increased risk of latent brain injuries caused by these repeated traumatic head 
impacts and therefore is in need of medical monitoring.”  Plaintiff’s Master Administrative 
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did not identify any claims on behalf of themselves. All counts were written 
as, “Retired NFL Football Players”105 without identification of the 
representative plaintiff to the subclass he seeks to represent and an analysis 
of count asserted by the named representative to each claim. The Class 
Action Complaint included the following claims alleged by plaintiffs, the 
class, and the subclasses: medical monitoring, negligent misrepresentation, 
pre-1968 negligence, post-1968 negligence, negligence from 1987-1993, 
post-1994 negligence, negligent hiring, negligent retention, fraudulent 
concealment, fraud, wrongful death and survival actions, civil conspiracy 
based on fraudulent concealment, and loss of consortium.106 Plaintiffs state 
typicality is met by the representatives Shawn Wooden and Kevin Turner, 
“in that each named Plaintiff and all members of the proposed Subclass are 
Retired NFL Football Players or assert rights and claims as a ‘Derivative 
Claimant’ or ‘Representative Claimant’ of a Retired NFL Football Player, 
as these terms are defined in the proposed Class and Subclass 
definitions.”107 Plaintiffs’ analysis of typicality states the following: 
 
In the case of the proposed medical monitoring program, which 
includes baseline assessments, and an education fund, the 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																	
Class Action Complaint for Medical Monitoring and Original Class Action Complaint at 4, 
In re NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS CONCUSSION INJURY 
LITIGATION, 775 F.3d 570 (3d Cir. 2014) (E.D. Pa. December 24, 2014 (No. 2:12-md-
02323-AB.). 
Subclass 1 consists of “all Retired NFL Football Players who were not diagnosed with 
dementia, Alzheimer’s Disease, Parkinson’s Disease, ALS and/or Death with CTE prior to 
the date of the Preliminary Approval and Class Certification Order and their Representative 
Claimants and Derivative Claimants.” Id. at 17. 
103. “Plaintiff Kevin Turner is a resident and citizen of the State of Alabama, residing 
in Birmingham, Alabama. Mr. Turner is a retired NFL football player. He played 
professional football in the NFL from 1992-1994 for the New England Patriots and from 
1995- 1999 for the Philadelphia Eagles as a fullback. Mr. Turner was diagnosed with ALS 
in June 2010.” Id. at 17. 
Subclass 2 consists of “all Retired NFL Football Players who were diagnosed with 
dementia, Alzheimer’s Disease, Parkinson’s Disease, ALS and/or Death with CTE prior to 
the date of the Preliminary Approval and Class Certification Order and their Representative 
Claimants and Derivative Claimants, and the Representative Claimants of deceased Retired 
NFL Football Players who were diagnosed with dementia, Alzheimer’s Disease, 
Parkinson’s Disease, ALS and/or Death with CTE prior to death or who died prior to the 
date of the Preliminary Approval and Class Certification Order and received a post-mortem 
diagnosis of CTE.” Id. at 17. 
104. Plaintiff’ Class Action Complaint at 17, In re NATIONAL FOOTBALL 
LEAGUE PLAYERS CONCUSSION INJURY LITIGATION, 961, F. Supp. 2d 708 (E.D. 
Pa. January 6, 2014 (No. 2:12-md-02323-AB). 
105. Id. at 252. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 23. 
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representative Plaintiffs and the Subclass members as a whole will 
benefit from such relief, and their interests are aligned, because they 
retired from playing professional football for the NFL, and because 
of their consequential increased risk of neurocognitive impairment, 
including ALS [Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis], Alzheimer’s, 
Parkinson’s, and dementia. The diagnostic testing, education, and 
collection of data will work to benefit the entire Class.108 
 
 The representative plaintiffs seek to hold the NFL Parties liable for 
damages as a result of the NFL Parties’ failure to warn of the dangers and the 
concealment of the dangers of NFL Football.109 
 Subsequent to preliminary certification by Judge Brody, members of the 
settlement class filed a motion for leave to assess the adequacy, fairness, and 
reasonableness of the proposed settlement.110 Reasons listed by the parties for 
request for leave include: failure to compensate specific neurocognitive 
impairments,111 failure to credit eligible seasons in non-American NFL leagues,112 
and the undetermined offset to compensation of the parties.113 
 In January of 2014, Judge Brody issued a memorandum addressing the 
preliminary approval of the proposed settlement between the Plaintiffs and NFL 
Defendants.114  The court held the settlement did not meet the requirements set out 
in the Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23(e).115 After the court issued its memorandum, the 
court held the class was preliminary certified for settlement under Rule 23(a).116 
The court held, Shawn Wooden and Kevin Turner satisfied the 23(a)(3) 
requirement of typicality because, “all claims asserted by subclass representatives 
and settlement class members are based on the same legal theories of negligence 
and fraud and arise from the same alleged wrongful conduct by the NFL 
Parties.”117 However, not long after, objecting parties filed for appeal with the 
__________________________________________________________________ 
108. Id. at 24. 
109. Motion of Proposed Co-Lead Class Counsel, Class Counsel, and Subclass Counsel 
for an Order at 43, In re National Football League Players Concussion Injury Litigation, 
961 F. Supp. 2d 708 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2014) (No. 2:12-md-02323-AB). 
110. Memorandum of Law in Support of Sean Morey, Alan Faneca, Ben Hamilton, 
Robert Royal, Roderick Cartwright, Jeff Rohrer, and Sean Considine’s Motion for Leave to 
Conduct Limited Discovery at 1, In re National Football League Concussion Injury 
Litigation, 961 F. Supp. 2d. 708 (E.D. Pa. September 13, 2014) (No. 2:12-md-02323-AB). 
111. Id. at 4. 
112. Id. at 6. 
113. Id. at 5. 
114. In re National Football League Concussion Injury Litigation, 961 F. Supp. 2d. 
708, 713 (E.D. Pa. 2014). 
115. Id. at 714. 
116. In re National Football League Concussion Injury Litigation, 301 F.R.D. 191, 204 
(E.D. Pa. 2014). 
117. Id. at 201. 
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Third Circuit.118 The Third Circuit court wrote, “the court must first determine that 
‘the requirements for class certification under Rule 23(a) and (b) are met, and must 
separately ‘determine that the settlement is fair to the class under [Rule] 23 
(e).’”119 The court further quoted the Manual for Complex Litigation by stating, 
“The judge should make a preliminary determination that the proposed class 
satisfies the criteria set out in Rule 23(a) and at least one of the subsections of Rule 
23(b).”120 However, the Third Circuit lacked jurisdiction because the District 
Court certified the class for settlement purposes only and reserved certification for 
a later date.121 
 After the Third Circuit Opinion was issued, Judge Brody ordered for 
amendments to the settlement agreement to ensure satisfaction of the 23(e) 
requirements.122 Ultimately, Judge Brody issued a memorandum granting the 
certification and approval of the class settlement.123 The court found typicality was 
satisfied because the Third Circuit has set a low threshold requirement for 
satisfaction of typicality.124 Further, Judge Brody explained typicality was met 
because both representatives “seek recovery pursuant to the same legal theory.”125 
The court relied on Baby Neal v. Casey quoting, “[C]ases challenging the same 
unlawful conduct which affects both the named plaintiffs and the putative class 
usually satisfy the typicality requirement irrespective of the varying fact patterns 
underlying the individual claims.”126 Moreover, Judge Brody stated, because some 
of the putative class members as indicated on the Short-Complaint form127 also 
seek medical monitoring, and some of the class members have a theory in tort of 
negligence and in contract of fraud, the remaining differences between the class 
“are immaterial to the typicality analysis.”128 
__________________________________________________________________ 
118. In re National Football League Players Concussion Injury Litigation, 775 F.3d 
570 (3d Cir. 2014). 
119. Id. at 581. 
120. Supra note 119. 
121. Id. at 584. 
122. Order at 2, In re National Football League Concussion Injury Litigation, 961 F. 
Supp. 2d 708 (E.D. Pa. February 2, 2015). 
123. Mem. at 132, In re National Football League Concussion Injury Litigation, 961 F. 
Supp. 2d 708 (E.D. Pa. April 22, 2015) (No. 2:12-md-02323-AB) 2015 WL1822254. 
124. Supra note 123 at 13. 
125. Id. 
126. Id.  
127. The Short-Complaint form is a fill in the blank or check the box complaint form 
that lists the injuries and legal theories of which the putative class member may opt-in to 
the class. 
128. Id. 
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C. The District Court Wrongfully Applied the Baby Neal Typicality 
Requirements 
1. Application of Baby Neal 
 
 After review of the precedent in the Supreme Court of the United 
States, Court of Appeals Third Circuit, and the intent of the drafters of Rule 
23(a), the District Court’s analysis is flawed. Certification of the National 
Football League Concussion Injury Litigation is improper absent 
application of the Baby Neal test. The Court’s determination that Shawn 
Wooden and Kevin Turner are sufficient representatives of the class should 
be reversed on appeal. The Baby Neal test requires the court to: (1) evaluate 
the sufficiency of the named plaintiff; (2) assess whether the action can be 
efficiently maintained; (3) assess whether legal theories of the named 
plaintiffs potentially conflict with those of absentees and; (4) inquire into 
whether the named plaintiff’s individual circumstances are markedly 
different or the legal theory upon which the claim is based.129 
 First, the court failed to evaluate the sufficiency of the named 
plaintiff.130 Typicality requires an evaluation of the “sufficiency of the 
named plaintiff,”131 but does not require that all the “putative class members 
share identical claims.”132 “Factual differences will not render a claim 
atypical if the claim arises from the same event or practice or course of 
conduct that gives rise to the claims of the class members, and if it is based 
on the same legal theory.”133 To determine sufficiency of the named 
plaintiff the district court must “assess whether the class representatives 
themselves present those common issues of law and fact that justify class 
treatment, thereby tending to assure that the absent class members will be 
adequately represented.”134 The plaintiff must make the required 
presentation demonstrating that he/she satisfied the requirements of that 
rule.135 
__________________________________________________________________ 
129. Baby Neal, 43 F.3d 56-58 (emphasis added). 
130. Id. 
131. Supra note 130. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 58 (citations omitted). 
134. Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson, & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 923 (3d Cir. 1992). 
135. Weiss v. York Hospital, 745 F.2d 786, 810-11 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting defendant's 
argument that "dichotomy between those who have applied and been rejected and those 
who are afraid to apply" was found to not be "enough to carry the day, for, in essence, there 
is only one class advanced in this case—the osteopathic physicians in the York MSA who 
are the intended victims of York's discriminatory admissions policy”). See also Hoxworth 
v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 923 (3d Cir. 1992) (where sufficiency of the 
named plaintiff was satisfied after a class was modified, to consist of fifteen class 
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 The District Court’s evaluation of the named plaintiffs merely 
stated, “Wooden and Turner seek recovery pursuant to the same legal 
theories as the absent Class Members. [Wooden and Turner] claim the NFL 
Parties should have known of, or intentionally concealed, the risks of head 
injuries in NFL Football. The claims of all Class Members, Wooden and 
Turner included, derive from the same wrongful course of conduct: the NFL 
Parties' decision to promote and structure NFL Football in a way that 
increased concussive impacts,”136 and is absent an analysis. 
 First, the court failed to evaluate sufficiency of Shawn Wooden and 
Kevin Turner from the complaint.  Even though sufficiency does not require 
Shawn Wooden or Kevin Turner to share identical claims with the putative 
class members, the claims of Wooden and Turner were aggregated to cover 
the range of negligence and fraudulent concealment claims. However, 
factual differences between Shawn Wooden, Kevin Turner, and the putative 
class members will not render the claims under the legal theory of tort and 
contract atypical because the claims asserted by the class arise from the 
same course of conduct,137 playing professional football in the NFL.138 
Conversely, the putative class members played for various teams, under 
direction of various coaches, with medical supervision from various team 
trainers and team medical staff, which is not the “same course of 
conduct.”139 Moreover, the NFL has changed in game play to ensure player 
safety.140 Since the changed rules of play over the various periods of the 
NFL, the conduct from 1929141 is not the same conduct as the conduct in 
1938142 or the conduct in 1979.143 Furthermore, the Plaintiff’s complaint is 
absent an analysis presenting Shawn Wooden and Kevin Turner’s common 
issues of law and fact. The complaint merely asserts, “[t]here are questions 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																	
representatives for the sub categories of the twenty-one fraudulent equity securities, "a 
coverage that fully satisfie[d] the requirements of the Rule."). 
136. Mem. at 13, In re NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONCUSSION INJURY 
LITIGATION, 307 F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Pa. May 27, 2015) (No. 2:12-md-02323-AB) 2015 
WL1822254. 
137. The District Court refers to “wrongful course of conduct” however the standard is 
same course of conduct.  The writer believes using the term “wrongful” displays bias and 
resulted in an inaccurate analysis, see Id. at 372. 
138. Mo. of Proposed Co-Lead Class Counsel, Class Counsel, and Subclass Counsel 
for an Order at 43, In re NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS CONCUSSION 
INJURY LITIGATION, 961 F. Supp. 2d 708 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2014) (No. 12-md-2323). 
139. Complaint at 17, In re NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS 
CONCUSSION INJURY LITIGATION, 961 F. Supp. 2d 708 (E.D. Pa. June 7, 2012) (No. 
2:12-md-02323-AB) 2012 WL 2045382. 
140. Id. at 117. 
141. Adding a field judge. See Id. at 92. 
142. Penalizing unnecessary rough conduct. See Id. 
143. Mandating equipment. See Id. 
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of law and fact common to the members of the Class and Subclasses.”144  
The burden rests on Shawn Wooden and Kevin Turner, the named 
plaintiffs, to demonstrate that the requirements of the claims asserted are 
met.145 The complaint is absent assertion that the named plaintiffs satisfy 
the elements of the rule of the claim(s) in the complaint.146 Also, the 
Plaintiff’s complaint does not set out the named plaintiffs’ satisfaction of 
the elements for a wrongful death suit, various negligence theories, or 
fraudulent concealment for the years that proceeded the named plaintiffs’ 
years of play in the NFL. Thus absent of the demonstrative requirement that 
the first prong of typicality is met, the District Court’s evaluation of the 
sufficiency of the named plaintiffs was flawed. 
 Second, typicality requires an assessment of “whether the action can 
be efficiently maintained as a class and whether the named plaintiffs have 
incentives that align with those of the absent class so as to assure that the 
absentees’ interests will be fairly represented.”147 The named plaintiffs does 
not have to “endure[] precisely the same injuries that have been sustained 
by the class members, only that the harm complained of to be common to 
the class, and that the named plaintiff demonstrate a personal interest or 
‘threat of injury . . . [that] is “real and immediate,” not conjectural or 
hypothetical.’”148 The named plaintiff may have incentives “plain enough 
from the pleadings to determine whether the interests of the absent parties 
are fairly encompassed.”149 However, the determination of whether the 
absentees’ interests will be fairly represented “generally involve 
considerations that are ‘enmeshed in factual and legal issues comprising the 
plaintiff’s cause of action.”150 
 The District Court’s holding that the injuries sustained by one of the 
objecting class members’ “short form complaint demonstrate[d] that his 
damages stemm[ed] from the same source as Wooden and Turner's 
damages: ‘repetitive, traumatic sub-concussive and/or concussive head 
__________________________________________________________________ 
144. The complaint sets out common questions of law satisfying F.R.C.P. 23(b)(2), 
however prerequisites set out in F.R.C.P. must be met prior to any other provisions in the 
rule. See Id. at 25 
145. Supra note 136. 
146. Complaint at 41-245, In re NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS 
CONCUSSION INJURY LITIGATION, 2012 WL 2045382 (E.D. Pa. June 7, 2012 (No. 
2:12-md-02323-AB). 
147. Complaint, supra note 146 at 57. (citations omitted). See American Pipe & 
Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974) (noting advancement of a class action 
promotes “the efficiency and economy of litigation which is the principal purpose of the 
procedure.”). 
148. Hassine, 846 F.2d 169, 177. 
149. Gen. Tel. Co., 457 U.S. 147, 160. 
150. Id. (citations omitted). 
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impacts during NFL games and/or practices’”151 is flawed. Shawn 
Wooden152 and Kevin Turner153 do not “[e]ndure precisely the same 
injuries,”154 as the members of the class and assert the harm common to the 
class is neurological impairment.155 Kevin Turner currently diagnosed with 
ALS,156 suffers a “real and immediate” threat of neurological impairment. 
Shawn Wooden alleged he experiences neurological symptoms157 and is at 
risk of a “hypothetical or conjectural”158 harm of neurological impairment, 
but he is undiagnosed of any neurological impairment.159 The named 
plaintiffs, class, and subclass as a whole complain of neurological 
impairment, undistinguished from each other appearing to share interests.160 
The District Court noted, similar to the interests of the named plaintiffs’ 
pleadings the objecting class member sought medical monitoring.161  
 Next, the court made the determination the absent members’ 
interests are ensured because the injuries complained of by the member of 
the class “sound in negligence and fraud,” and the factual difference of the 
objecting member of the class participating in NFL Europe, rather than NFL 
America, and any remaining differences “are immaterial to the typicality 
analysis.”162 However, the District Court erred by stating the remaining 
differences other than the harm alleged and the legal claim asserted are 
“immaterial to the typicality analysis.” 
__________________________________________________________________ 
151. Mem. at 13, In re NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONCUSSION INJURY 
LITIGATION, 307 F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2015) (No. 2:12-md-02323-AB) 2015 
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Pa. January 6, 2014 (No. 2:12-md-02323-AB). 
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 The second prong of the Baby Neal typicality analysis considers the 
“factual and legal issues comprising of the plaintiff’s claim.”163 To 
determine whether the interests of the named plaintiffs are aligned with 
those of the absent members of the class, factual and legal issues of the 
plaintiffs are considered.164 The objecting class member played in NFL 
Europe and suffers from symptoms of CTE in contrast to the named 
plaintiffs who both played in the NFL American league; specifically, 
Wooden who suffers from ALS or Turner who is undiagnosed. However, to 
prove a claim of negligence, the element of causation requires an analysis 
into the facts and the relationship between the facts which resulted in the 
harm. Causation is proven using the “but for” analysis.  But for the conduct 
of the NFL, the injury of the sub-traumatic contacts to the head would not 
have occurred. The second prong of the Baby Neal test for typicality may be 
met if the facts which resulted in the harm in the NFL Europe League and 
other sub-leagues, are similar to the facts which resulted in the harm in the 
NFL American League. 
 Third, because typicality “is intended to preclude certification of 
those cases where the legal theories of the named plaintiffs potentially 
conflict” with absentee members of the class, it requires that the “common 
claims are comparably central to claims of the named plaintiffs as to claims 
of the absentees.”165 “This approach focuses on the legal and/or factual 
stance assumed by the class representative as compared with that of the 
class members.”166 
 The District Court’s decision is absent an analysis of the “legal 
and/or factual stance assumed by the class representative[s] as compared 
with that of the class members,”167 because the court wrote in its’ opinion 
the class representatives like other members of the class seek the same 
remedy.168 Further, the court only analyzed the class representatives claims 
compared to the objecting class members, not compared to the class as a 
whole. 
 Typicality “is intended to preclude certification” 169 of the Retired 
NFL Player class “where the legal theories”170 of Shawn Wooden and 
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163. Supra note 89, at 13. 
164. Id. 
165. Baby Neal, 43 F.3d 48, 57 (citations omitted). 
166. Weiss, 745 F.2d 786, 809 n.36. 
167. Supra note 92, at 13. 
168. Memorandum at 13, In re NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONCUSSION 
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169. Supra note 91, at 13. 
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Kevin Turner potentially conflict with the absentee members of the class.171  
It requires that the “common claims”172 of negligence and fraudulent 
concealment are “comparably central”173 which focuses on the “legal and/or 
factual”174 stance of claims of Shawn Wooden and Kevin Turner, as well as 
to the claims of the absentee members of the class. Shawn Wooden and 
Kevin Turner “assert fourteen claims175 which can be generally grouped 
into negligence and fraudulent concealment claims.”176 Here, the named 
plaintiffs potentially conflict with absentee members of the class because 
the legal theory of tort, specifically a claim of negligence, requires an 
inquiry into the facts to prove causation. 
 Meeting this burden is difficult because since consolidation of the 
cases, “5,000 players have filed over 300 similarly situated lawsuits against 
the NFL parties.”177 The absentee class members have played on various 
teams, in different positions, for various NFL leagues, during different years 
of in game play.178 Further analysis into individual facts of Shawn Wooden 
and Kevin Turner would likely show contrasting causation during the 
course of their careers in professional football because Wooden and Turner 
played in the NFL American league in different years, held different 
positions, on different teams, for a various amount of seasons.179 Thus the 
class should not be certified because typicality is intended to preclude 
certification and the District Court did not apply the third prong of the Baby 
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175. “The Class Action Complaint includes claims for medical monitoring, negligent 
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CONCUSSION INJURY LITIGATION, 961 F. Supp. 2d 708 (E.D. Pa. September 13, 
2014) (No. 2:12-md-02323-AB). 
179. Plaintiff’ Class Action Complaint at 4, In re NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 
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Neal test there is a potential conflict between Wooden, Turner, and the 
absentee class member.180 
 Lastly, typicality requires an inquiry into “whether the named 
plaintiff’s individual circumstances are markedly different or . . . the legal 
theory upon which claims based differs from that upon which claims of the 
absent class will perforce be based.”181 The named plaintiff’s “[m]ere 
anticipation that all class members will benefit from the suit ... is not 
enough.”182 The interests must be “sufficiently parallel to ensure a vigorous 
and full presentation of all potential claims for relief.”183 
 The court’s “[m]ere anticipation that all class members will benefit 
from the suit,”184 is not sufficient to meet the requirements of typicality.185 
The District Court’s analysis into whether Shawn Wooden and Kevin 
Turner’s individual circumstances are markedly different compared to the 
absent class members is minimal.   
 The court held, “repetitive, traumatic sub-concussive and/or 
concussive head impacts during NFL games and/or practices”186 sustained 
by the named plaintiffs are the same as the members of the class. However, 
the claims upon which some derivative representative plaintiffs and the 
absentee class members will perforce be based differ and the court’s 
holding the claims of the class representatives are typical of those who they 
represent is flawed.187 The interests of Shawn Wooden and Kevin Turner 
must be “sufficiently parallel”188 to the interests those who claim wrongful 
death and other theories of negligence or fraudulent concealment.  Although 
the settlement covers six (6) forms of relief, 189 the named plaintiffs have 
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not “ensure[d] a vigorous and full presentation of all potential claims for 
relief.”190   
 Shawn Wooden’s relief of medical monitoring, and Kevin Turner’s 
relief of money damages stemming from his injuries are markedly different 
individual circumstances from class members who suffer from wrongful 
death or various traumatic sub-concussive injuries. Thus, the fourth 
typicality prong is not met. 
2. Comparison to Amchem Requirements 
	
	 This case is much akin to Amchem.191 In Amchem,192  after parties 
reached a settlement agreement for a fund that included an administrative 
distribution mechanism,193 the Supreme Court held, the representatives 
must possess the same interest, same injury, and the diverse medical 
conditions must have discrete subclasses.194 Like Amchem the 
representative plaintiffs, Shawn Wooden and Kevin Turner, seek to 
represent all retired football players, of all NFL teams, including European 
teams, their respective spouses and families, diagnosed and undiagnosed.195 
The interest of the named plaintiffs is to hold the NFL liable for damages 
Kevin Turner and Sean Wooden possess the same injury of neurocognitive 
impairment as other class members.196 or possibility of neurocognitive 
impairment as members of the class197 are representative of only two 
subclasses that cover a wide array of injury, not distinct to each 
representative’s claim of injury.198 However, the diverse medical conditions 
of CTE, Parkinson’s Disease, and Alzheimer’s Disease do not have discrete 
subclasses or representatives of those classes. Further, the subclass of 
derivative representatives for claims of wrongful death does not have a 
discrete subclass and representative. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
190. Supra note 95. 
191. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
192. Id. at 603. 
193. The Third Circuit held the District Court erred because it “took the view that Rule 
23 requirements are lower for settlement classes.” Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 83 F.3d 
610, 626 (3d Cir. 1996). 
194. Id. (emphasis added). 
195. Supra note 101. Supra note 102. Cf. to Amchem where nine lead plaintiffs as 
representatives of the class with varying medical conditions were found to not satisfy 
typicality. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 602 (1997). 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. Supra note 96. 
210 PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. L.F [Vol. 6:1:1 
 Judge Brody set a low threshold for satisfying typicality199 similar to 
Amchem’s district court holding, which the Court of Appeals reversed and 
the Supreme Court upheld the reversal.200 The Supreme Court of the United 
States specifically stated in Amchem all prerequisites, including typicality, 
must be met even when taking into account a possible settlement of the 
class action201 such as the decision that was before Judge Brody. Thus the 
NFL Concussion Injury Litigation is much akin to Amchem and the Retired 
Football Player class should not have been certified. 
CONCLUSION 
	
 The District Court’s analysis of the typicality requirement is flawed. 
Baby Neal is the controlling case in the Third Circuit.202 The class 
representatives failed to make the required representation in the complaint 
that the named plaintiffs satisfied the sufficiency requirements of the claims 
asserted.203 Further, the District Court erred by stating, “[t]he Third Circuit 
has ‘set a low threshold for satisfying’ the typicality requirement” ruling 
against Supreme Court precedent.204 Moreover, incentives of the named 
plaintiffs must be aligned with those of the class.205  In this case the named 
plaintiffs failed to make the representation that incentives of the named 
representatives are aligned with those of the class. Typicality is intended to 
preclude certification206 and requires an inquiry into whether the individual 
circumstances or the named representatives are so different, absentee class 
member’s interests would not be protected.207 Absent proof from the named 
representatives’ satisfaction of typicality, an analysis of the named 
representatives is non-existent and the class should not be certified. 
 This article urges the Third Circuit Court of Appeals to order 
discrete subclasses be formed. The Third Circuit should also require named 
plaintiffs, make the required presentation demonstrating the named 
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plaintiffs’ satisfaction of the requirements of the rule for the subclass each 
representative seeks to represent. Similar to Amchem the various facts of 
each member may pose too large of a problem to certify the class.  
Moreover, speculation as to whether an undiagnosed player will suffer an 
injury is too remote.208 
 Therefore, on appeal the Third Circuit should decertify the class in 
the National Football League Injury Concussion Litigation. 
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208. Cf. Georgine v. Amchem Products Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 632 (noting, “[S]ome will 
incur little or no physical impairments. Given these uncertainties which will ultimately turn 
into vastly different outcomes, the futures plaintiffs share too little in common to generate a 
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